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The current regulation of the market for prescription
drugs in German health insurance is under pressure
for two reasons. First, third-party payers are unable
to control expenditures effectively. Expenditures for
prescription drugs are continuously increasing and at
a more rapid pace than expenditures in other health
care sectors such as ambulatory care and hospital
care.Second,third-party payers are incapable of set-
ting incentives for individual physicians to prescribe
more efficiently. Physicians prescribe a considerable
share of prescription drugs that are more expensive
than therapeutic or generic substitutes (Schwabe
and Paffrath 2005).
In this paper we develop and present reform sce-
narios for the regulation of prescription drugs in
German health insurance by comparing two
important parameters for third-party payers and
manufacturers across health care systems. These
parameters are regulation of reimbursement and
regulation of pricing. Reimbursement and pricing
of prescription drugs are regulated extensively in a
variety of health care systems. It is obvious that
markets for prescription drugs are regulated in
health care systems that are predominantly fin-
anced by public funds – tax money or social securi-
ty contributions. However, there is also regulation
of prescription drugs in health care systems that
are predominantly financed privately – such as the
private health insurance sector in the US health
care system. The difference is in the level of regu-
lation. As a rule, we find centralized regulation in
public systems – either by government itself, agen-
cies authorized by government or by some kind of
corporatist intermediaries authorized by law.
Centralized regulation implies that the outcome of
this regulation – such as reimbursement decisions
and prices for prescription drugs – is the same for
all third-party payers. In contrast, decentralized
regulation prevails in private systems. In the pri-
vate health insurance sector of the US health care
system, individual health plans, pharmaceutical
benefits managers or other intermediaries negoti-
ate with manufacturers directly in order to deter-
mine reimbursement decisions and individual
prices of prescription drugs. As a consequence,
the outcome of decentralized regulation may vary
between third-party payers.
In this article we compare different levels of regula-
tion across different types of health care systems
which determine reimbursement decisions and pric-
ing decisions. Reimbursement decisions determine
whether a specific prescription drug will be reim-
bursed by third-party-payers. Pricing decisions de-
termine the price third-party-payers have to pay for
this specific prescription drug. Our comparison
includes a variety of different health care systems –
one-payer public systems such as the UK, multiple-
payer public systems such as Switzerland and multi-
ple-payer private systems such as the private health
insurance sector in the US.However,as already indi-
cated by the title of our article, the spotlight of our
attention is on reimbursement and pricing decisions
in German social health insurance.
The article is organized as follows. In section 2 we
analyze reimbursement regulation – both on a cen-
tralized and on a decentralized level. In order to
illustrate reimbursement regulation on a centralized
level we discuss short case studies on Germany,
Switzerland and the UK. In order to illustrate reim-
bursement decisions on a decentralized level we dis-
cuss case studies on the private health insurance
market in the US and – although only partly applic-
able – on the social health insurance market in
Israel. In section 3 we analyze pricing regulation –
again both on a centralized and on a decentralized
level.We use the same short case studies to illustrate
our findings. Finally, in section 4 we discuss reform
scenarios for the regulation of reimbursement and of
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insurance. We conclude that decentralized pricing
and centralized reimbursement is a viable compro-
mise between consumer protection and a more com-
petitive and cost-effective market for prescription
drugs in German social health insurance – and other
similar markets for prescription drugs.
Regulation of reimbursement
Reimbursement of prescription drugs in any third-
party-payer system is not equivalent to market
approval by regulatory agencies such as the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) in the US. In any
third-party-payer system a variety of instruments to
determine the reimbursement status of prescription
drugs is being used (Greß et al. 2005b). We distin-
guish between instruments that are used on a cen-
tralized level and instruments that are used on a
decentralized level.
Centralized regulation
The results of our review of instruments used to
determine the reimbursement status of prescription
drugs on a centralized level are displayed in Table 1.
Most European countries indeed use centralized
regulation in addition to market approval.The effec-
tiveness of new prescription drugs is assessed by a
centralized institution. Moreover, theses institutions
are also increasingly required to assess the cost-
effectiveness of new prescription drugs. However,
the assessment of cost-effectiveness very rarely leads
to the exclusion of prescription drugs from reim-
bursement. The outcome of (cost-) effectiveness
assessments result in country-specific formularies
which sometimes are augmented by lists of prescrip-
tion drugs to be excluded form reimbursement.
Although these results point toward common trends
in centralized regulation, details of regulation differ
considerably between countries. This finding can be
illustrated by short case studies of centralized regu-
lation in Germany,Switzerland and the UK (Greß et
al. 2005a).
In German social health insurance, reimbursement
decisions are made on a central level by a corporatist
body – the Federal Joint Committee. The Federal
Joint Committee consists of representatives of sick-
ness funds, health care providers and patient organi-
zations. Representatives of patient organizations are
allowed to attend. However, they are not allowed to
vote. It was only in 2004 that the legislator allowed
this corporatist body to exclude prescriptions drugs
from reimbursement. These decisions need to be
based on a (negative) clinical effectiveness assess-
ment of the prescription drug concerned. Reim-
bursement of all other prescription drugs with mar-
ket approval is mandatory for all social health insur-
ers in Germany. In contrast to most other countries,
there is no country-specific formulary in Germany.
The new German Institute for Quality and Effi-
ciency in Health Care is responsible of conducting
health technology assessments and for giving recom-
mendations to the Joint Committee. However, Ger-
man legislation rules out the use of cost-effective-
ness assessments as a criterion for determining the
reimbursement status of prescription drugs.
In Switzerland, the reimbursement status of pre-
scription drugs is also determined on a centralized
level. Formally, the Swiss Federal Office of Public
Health is in charge of all reimbursement decisions.
The Federal Office has established the Federal Drug
Commission to give recommendations for reim-
bursement decisions.The Federal Drug Commission
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Table 1 
Instruments for centralized regulation in EU-15













Austria X ++ X
Belgium X ++ X
Denmark X ++ X
Finland X ++ X
France X ++ X
Germany X – –
Greece X + X
Ireland X ++ X
Italy X ++ X
Netherlands X ++ X
Norway X ++ X
Portugal X ++ X
Spain X + X
Sweden X ++ X
Switzerland X + X
UK X +++ X
Luxembourg, Liechtenstein and Iceland not in-
cluded.
X   Implemented.
–       Not implemented.
+   Emerging assessment of cost-effectiveness.
++   Assessment of cost-effectiveness is obligatory  
but not a criterion for exclusion. 
+++ Strong assessment of cost-effectiveness is also
used as a criterion for exclusion. 
 Sources: Dickson et al. 2003; Greß et al. 2005b;
 Stafinski and Menon 2003.CESifo DICE Report 2/2006 41
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consists of physicians, pharmacists, academics, repre-
sentatives of health insurers,of patient organizations
and of manufacturers.In contrast to Germany,health
insurers may reimburse only those prescription
drugs that are listed on the country-specific formula-
ry.The Federal Drug Commission lists new prescrip-
tion drugs if the assessment of clinical effectiveness
has been positive. Moreover, the assessment results
in a classification of new prescription drugs based on
their degree of innovation. Although legislation
requires assessments to be based also on cost-effec-
tiveness of new prescription drugs, assessment of
cost-effectiveness so far is not a criterion for exclu-
sion from reimbursement in Switzerland (Cranovsky
et al. 2000).
Similar to Germany and Switzerland,in England and
Wales the reimbursement status of prescription
drugs is determined on a centralized level by the
National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE).
Decisions are made by the Appraisal Committee
which consists of health care providers, representa-
tives of manufacturers, patient organisations, repre-
sentatives of regional health authorities und health
economists. In contrast to Switzerland, NICE does
not list all prescription drugs that are eligible for
reimbursement. Regional health authorities are
required to reimburse drugs which are recommend-
ed by NICE and may also reimburse all other drugs
that are not excluded by NICE. Only very rarely
does NICE exclude prescription drugs form reim-
bursement completely. However, it is quite common
that NICE limits the use of drugs to certain indica-
tions and populations subgroups. The use of cost-
effectiveness as a decision criterion for reimburse-
ment is quite advanced in England and Wales
(Devlin and Parkin 2004).
Decentralized Regulation
Reimbursement decisions usually are made on a
centralized level. In countries with one-payer health
care systems such as England or France there is no
alternative to this approach. Diverging reimburse-
ment decisions for the same payer – e.g. in different
regions – are difficult to imagine. However, there is
an alternative to centralized regulation in multi-
payer systems such as Switzerland or Germany. If
there are multiple third-party payers – and enrollees
of these payers may switch to other payers on a reg-
ular basis – it is quite conceivable that reimburse-
ment decisions are made on a decentralized level.As
a consequence, individual payers make individual
reimbursement decisions. This practice is rather
common in the US private health insurance market
and – at least to some extent – in the social health
insurance market in Israel.
In fact reimbursement decisions in Israel are made
on a centralized level as well as on a decentralized
level. However, there is some latitude for individual
health insurers.This flexibility is limited to prescrip-
tion drugs that can be substituted generically or ther-
apeutically. As a consequence, health insurers in
Israel have individual formularies for these products.
However,stand-alone patents need to be reimbursed
by all health insurers (Sax 2001).
In contrast to the social health insurance market in
Israel, there is no centralized regulation at all for
reimbursement decisions on the private health insur-
ance market in the US. However, this does not mean
that market approval of prescription drugs by the
FDA is equivalent to reimbursement by private
health insurers. It does mean that health insurers are
free to determine insurer-specific formularies. In
doing so, health insurers are not restricted by central-
ized institutions. As a consequence of the managed
care revolution in the 1980s and 1990s, most health
insurers in the US have developed insurer-specific
formularies (Frank 2001). The design of insurer-spe-
cific formularies varies considerably. Three types of
insurer-specific formularies – the main instruments of
decentralized reimbursement regulation – can be dis-
tinguished (Huskamp et al. 2003):
1. Open Formularies. Open Formularies contain
prescription drugs which are preferred by the
health insurer.However,physicians may also pre-
scribe other products which the health insurer
will also reimburse.
2. Closed Formularies. Closed Formularies contain
all prescription drugs which are reimbursed by
the health insurer. If physicians prescribe other
products the health insurers will not reimburse
them.
3. Incentive Formularies. Incentive Formularies are
closed formularies that allow physicians and
patients more choice for generic and therapeutic
substitutes. Co-payments for patients are higher
for branded generics and me-too patents.
Private health insurers have become reluctant to use
closed formularies since they are unpopular with
consumers. Now they mostly use a mix of open and
closed formularies. Moreover, incentive formularieshave become more pervasive recently (Peters et al.
2001). It is not transparent which criteria private
health insurers in the US use for designing insurer
specific formularies. Variations in the use of cost-
effectiveness assessments are high although a non-
binding standard for the development of evidence-
based formularies was established in the year 2000
(Garbner 2004; Neumann 2004).
For the new Medicare drug coverage starting in 2006
– which can also be provided by private health insur-
ers – legislation explicitly allows closed formularies
for generic and therapeutic substitutes (Atlas 2004).
As a consequence, regulation in this part of the US
health care system is now quite similar to regulation
in Israel.
Regulation of pricing
We have shown that third-party-payers in any kind
of health care system use a variety of instruments to
regulate reimbursements of prescription drugs. In
this section we analyze the instruments third-party-
payers use to regulate the pricing of reimbursable
prescription drugs. Again we distinguish between
instruments that are applied on a centralized level
and instruments that are applied on a decentralized
level.
Centralized regulation
Table 2 illustrates the fact that
there is a variety of instruments
being used in order to regulate
pricing of prescription drugs on a
centralized level. Many countries
use direct price regulation.Direct
price regulation means that man-
ufacturers are not free to deter-
mine prices freely. Either third-
party-payers determine prices by
themselves or third-party-payers
negotiate with manufacturers
about prices. In most countries
prices are determined by the use
of external reference prices of
the product. Some countries such
as France and Switzerland allow
surcharges on the price if – as a
result of (cost-) effectiveness as-
sessments – the product is known
to be very innovative.
Other countries – such as Germany and the Nether-
lands – use a more indirect and less restrictive
approach to regulate prices. In principle, manufac-
turers are free to set prices for all products that are
reimbursable. However, in these countries thera-
peutic and generic substitutes are clustered into
groups on a centralized level. For each of these
groups a reference price is determined.Generic and
therapeutic reference prices need to be distin-
guished. Generic substitutes are pharmaceuticals
with the same active ingredients and formulation.
Therapeutic substitutes are pharmaceuticals with
different active ingredients and formulations but
with comparable therapeutic effects for the same
indication (Danzon et al. 2005).
Third-party payers will reimburse only the reference
price. If physicians prescribe products with a price
above the reference price, patients need to pay the
surcharge out-of-pocket. Manufacturers have a
strong incentive for charging prices that are equiva-
lent to the reference price. If the price were below
the reference price, only third-party-payers and – if
user charges are proportional to price – patients
would profit from lower prices. On the other hand,
patients are very sensitive to surcharges for products
with a price above the reference price (Pavcnik 2002;
Schneeweiss et al. 2002a).
Traditionally, manufacturers in Germany were free
to set prices for reimbursable prescription drugs.
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Table 2 















Austria X – X – X
Belgium X X – – X
Denmark – X X – X
Finland X – – – X
France X X – – X
Germany – X X – –
Greece X – – – X
Ireland X – – – X
Italy X X – – X
Netherlands – X X – X
Norway X – – – X
Portugal X X – – X
Spain X X – – X
Sweden X X – – X








Luxembourg, Liechtenstein and Iceland not included. 
X Implemented.
– Not implemented.
Source: Greß et al. 2005b.CESifo DICE Report 2/2006 43
Research Reports
However, free pricing was restrained by the internal
reference price system that was adopted in 1989.
Although there have been several short periods of
direct price controls of the German government to
cut overall prices, free pricing is unrestricted for
stand-alone patents. Reference prices are applicable
for generic as well as for therapeutic substitutes in
Germany. While generic substitutes are adequately
covered by the reference price system,this is not true
for therapeutic substitutes.Only since the 2004 health
care reform,has the legislator again allowed the Joint
Federal Committee to establish groups of therapeu-
tic substitutes – including me-too patents.This provi-
sion was suspended from 1996 to 2003.
In contrast to Germany, there is no free pricing for
prescription drugs in Switzerland.The Swiss Federal
Office of Public Health and manufacturers negotiate
prices for new prescription drugs. Negotiations start
if (cost-) effectiveness assessment of the new prod-
uct (see section 2) has been positive.Prices are based
on external ex-factory reference prices in Denmark,
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. If the new
prescription drug is shown to be very innovative, the
Federal Office adds a surcharge to the external ref-
erence price – up to 20 percent for a maximum of
15 years. If manufactures are not willing to supply
their products with the price suggested by the
Federal Office, the product will not be listed on the
country-specific formulary.
Although manufacturers are free to set prices for
patented prescription drugs in the UK, they face a
unique method of indirect price regulation. The
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS)
stipulates that manufacturers have to lower prices if
their profits exceed a threshold.If manufacturers fall
below these thresholds they may raise prices of their
products. At the moment the thresholds are 21 per-
cent for return on capital and six percent for return
on sales. However, the margin of tolerance is quite
substantial – between 40 percent and 140 percent.As
a consequence,manufacturers need to lower prices if
their return on capital exceeds 29.4 percent and if
return on sales exceeds 8.4 percent. They may raise
prices if return on capital falls below 8.4 percent and
if return on sales falls below 2.4 percent (Association
of the British Pharmaceutical Industry and Depart-
ment of Health 2005).
Decentralized regulation
Although centralized regulation of pricing is as per-
vasive as centralized regulation of reimbursement,
there is also a variety of instruments to regulate pric-
ing of prescription drugs on a decentralized level.As
a consequence, the price of the same prescription
drug may vary considerably between third-party-
payers, although it would be the same for all third-
party-payers if it were regulated on a centralized
level. In Israel price competition is limited to gener-
ic and therapeutic substitutes (see section 2). The
market for social health insurers is highly concen-
trated in Israel.There are only four competing social
health insurers in Israel.The biggest – Clalit – has a
market share of about 60 percent.As a consequence,
price competition for substitutes is high and third-
party-payers are quite successful in negotiating re-
bates with manufacturers (Sax 2001).
Decentralized regulation of pricing also leads to
price competition for prescription drugs on the pri-
vate health insurance market in the US. Multiple
third-party payers are free to negotiate prices with
manufacturers of prescription drugs. If third-party
payers are not satisfied with the results of these
negotiations they are also free not to list these prod-
ucts on their insurer-specific formularies. On the
other hand manufacturers can also decide not to
supply their products if they are not satisfied with
the price offered by a third party. In contrast to
health care systems with centralized pricing regula-
tion, manufacturers may find other third-party pay-
ers who are willing to pay a higher price.
Decentralized regulation of pricing on the private
health insurance market in the US is not equivalent
to negotiations between individual third-party pay-
ers and individual manufacturers.Although this set-
ting might occur,mostly third-party payers have out-
sourced the negotiating process to PBMs – pharma-
ceutical benefit managers (Goff 2002). PBMs per-
form a variety of tasks for third-party payers in the
US. Most importantly, PBMs assist in the design of
insurers-specific formularies, negotiate discounts
and rebates with manufacturers of prescription
drugs and organize retail services for enrollees
(GAO 2003).
Actually third-party payers and PBMs negotiate dis-
counts, not prices, with manufacturers. The size of
discounts usually depends on the prescription vol-
ume of the product. The more physicians prescribe
the product – and the more patients consume it – the
higher are the discounts. As a consequence, PBMs
negotiate discounts form manufacturers in return for
a preferred status on the insurer-specific formularyand an increase in market share
(Danzon et al. 2005).
Information about the size of
discounts is difficult to obtain.
However, it is estimated that
PBMs can negotiate rebates of
up to 35 percent of the standard
prize for patents (US DHHS
2002). PBMs keep 10 to 30 per-
cent of the savings for them-
selves (Pennsylvania Health
Care Cost Containment Council
2004). Rebates are tied closely
to insurer-specific formularies and to contractual
relations with physicians. Third-party payers and
PBMs set incentives for physicians as well as for
enrolees to increase the use of preferred prescription
drugs. Physicians are either obliged to prescribe
them if they are employed by a third-party payer.
The prescription of preferred drugs can also be part
of the contract between third-party payers and
physicians. Moreover, patients often pay lower user
charges for preferred prescription drugs if third-
party payers use incentive formularies.
As a consequence, price competition is highest for
generic substitutes and lowest for stand-alone
patents. Concentration of the US pharmaceutical
industry has increased since the beginning of the
managed care revolution. Manufacturers try to
counteract the strong position of third-party payers
and PBMs.Moreover,manufacturers of prescription
drugs were able to recover some of their revenues
losses due to discounts to PBMs by raising the stan-
dard prize of their products. Thus, uninsured indi-
viduals and non-negotiating third-payers have to
pay an even higher price for prescription drugs
(Frank 2001).
Future regulation of prescription drugs in German
social health insurance
Sections 2 and 3 have shown that several features of
pricing and reimbursement of prescription drugs in
German social health insurance are peculiar. First,
only in German social health insurance is market
approval of new products almost equivalent to
reimbursement by third-party payers. Second, only
in 2004 did legislation make it possible to exclude
prescription drugs from reimbursement with a neg-
ative effectiveness assessment.Third, in contrast to
other health care systems, the legislator has not
introduced the use of cost-effectiveness assess-
ments for reimbursement decisions. Fourth, manu-
facturers of prescription drugs are free to set prices
for their products – although free pricing has been
restricted by internal reference pricing for generic
substitutes since 1989 and for therapeutic substi-
tutes since 2004.
Since expenditures for prescription drugs in German
social health insurance are constantly increasing, we
assume that the legislator will continue to adjust the
regulation of reimbursement and the pricing of pre-
scription drugs. Table 3 points out three reform sce-
narios that are based on our analysis in sections 2 and
3. In scenario #1, the legislator will improve the exist-
ing system of centralized reimbursement and central-
ized pricing. In scenario #2 reimbursement decisions
will remain on a centralized level while pricing deci-
sions will be decentralized – similar to the system of
social health insurance in Israel or Medicare 2006 in
the USA. If the legislator adopts scenario #3, both
reimbursement and pricing decisions will be decen-
tralized – similar to the private health insurance sys-
tem in the US.Below we discuss the consequences for
patients, manufacturers and third-party payers for
each of the three reform scenarios.
Scenario #1: Centralized reimbursement and
centralized pricing
This reform approach assumes that the legislator will
follow a path-dependent approach.Two main features
of regulation reimbursement and pricing will remain
unchanged. First, regulation will continue to be cen-
tralized.Second,pricing regulation will continue to be
indirect rather than direct.As a consequence, the leg-
islator will primarily improve the effectiveness of
internal reference prices.Moreover,the legislator will
introduce the use of cost-effectiveness assessments
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Table 3 
Levels of regulation: Reimbursement and pricing 
Reimbursement
Centralized Decentralized
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for reimbursement decisions. In fact the obligatory
use of cost-effectiveness assessments for reimburse-
ment decisions was included in an early draft of the
2004 health care reform – but did not make it into the
final draft of the reform law.
If reimbursement decisions in German social health
insurance are made on the basis of cost-effectiveness
assessments,two approaches for implementation will
be feasible. First, only prescription drugs with a pos-
itive assessment will be listed on a country-specific
formulary.Other prescription drugs will be excluded
from reimbursement. Second, only prescription
drugs with a positive assessment will be excluded
from reference pricing. All other drugs will be sub-
ject to therapeutic reference pricing. As a conse-
quence, prescription drugs with a negative cost-
effectiveness ratio will continue to be reimbursed –
albeit only on the level of the reference price. Given
the German proclivity toward reference pricing, we
consider the latter approach to be more feasible.As
a consequence, there will be free pricing for stand-
alone patents and internal reference pricing for
generic and therapeutic substitutes.
What will be the consequence of this approach?
Patients will be eligible to full reimbursement for
stand-alone patents and for reimbursement of the
reference price of products that are generically or
therapeutically equivalent. If groups are homoge-
nous, effects on patients are negligible (Schneeweiss
et al. 2002b). However, therapeutic referencing is
more controversial than generic referencing.It treats
prescription drugs with different ingredients as per-
fect substitutes although effectiveness and/or side-
effects might be different for at least some patients
(Danzon et al. 2005). If groups are heterogeneous
with respects to effectiveness and/or side effects and
manufacturers are unwilling to lower their price to
the reference price,some patients will face increased
co-payments. Even worse, manufacturers might take
their products from the market entirely.
Consequences for manufacturers in this setting also
depend very much on the ability to establish homo-
genous therapeutic reference groups on a central-
ized level. If groups are homogenous, manufacturers
face increased incentives to invest in innovative
products rather than in me-too products.However,if
groups are heterogeneous, manufacturers face disin-
centives to invest in innovations at all since they
might not be able to recover their costs for research
and development from the lower reference price.
Effects on third-party payers are unclear.Third-party
payers are less interested in prices of prescription
drugs than in expenditures for prescription drugs.
Expenditures are determined by price, volume and
the composition of prescriptions. Prices for stand-
alone patents in our setting probably will increase
while prices for me-too patents will decrease. Prices
for generics will not change very much. If prescrip-
tion behavior does not change, expenditures decline.
However, if physicians switch to prescribing stand-
alone patents rather than me-too patents or generics,
expenditures will not go down. Third-party payers
have no influence on the outcome either way since
they are unable to set incentives for physicians to
prescribe more efficiently.
Scenario #2: Centralized reimbursement and decen-
tralized pricing
In this scenario, third-party payers in German social
health insurance will be able to negotiate with manu-
facturers about discounts and market shares for
generic and therapeutic substitutes.In principle reim-
bursement decisions will remain centralized as
described in scenario #1.However,in contrast to sce-
nario #1, third-party payers will only be obliged to
reimburse stand-alone patents and at least one pre-
scription drug per therapeutic or generic group.As a
consequence,third-party payers will be able to estab-
lish insurer-specific incentive formularies.As a result,
there might be no user charges at all for preferred
products. In contrast, patients will either have to pay
hefty surcharges for therapeutic or generic substi-
tutes that are not part of the insurer-specific formu-
lary or – more consistently – will have to pay the full
price for these substitutes out-of-pocket.
However, decentralized negotiations between third-
party payers and manufacturers about rebates in
return for preferred status on insurer-specific formula-
ries only make sense if third-party payers are able to
create sufficient incentives for physicians to increase
market shares of preferred products.This is impossible
in the current setting of contractual relations between
third-party payers and physicians in German social
health insurance. In principle, all third-party payers
need to contract all willing providers. Selective con-
tracting is limited to very few experimental schemes.
Thus,third-party payers are not able to contract selec-
tively. As a consequence, they are not able to gain
competitive advantages. However, decentralization of
pricing decisions is all about gaining competitive
advantages, which only makes sense in a more com-petitive setting (Greß 2004). Only in a more competi-
tive setting will individual third-party payers be able to
design contractual arrangements with physicians to
promote prescription drugs with a preferred status.
In this scenario,price competition for therapeutic and
generic substitutes will increase. Prices for stand-
alone patents are not influenced. Patients will benefit
from lower user-charges.Moreover,if third-party pay-
ers are able to influence prescription behavior of
physicians successfully, patients can ultimately also
benefit form lower health care expenses of third-
party payers by paying lower premiums.For manufac-
turers, the consequences of this scenario depend very
much on their product portfolio. Price competition
will increase for manufacturers that only produce
therapeutic and generic substitutes. However, if man-
ufacturers are able to offer a large variety of products,
they will probably have a good bargaining position.
As a consequence, concentration will increase. The
position of producers of stand-alone patents will not
change very much.Therefore,incentives for the devel-
opment of innovative products are even more pro-
nounced than in scenario #1 – if groups for generic
and therapeutic substitutes are homogenous.
Scenario #3: Decentralized reimbursement and
decentralized pricing
This scenario assumes that third-party payers are free
to determine reimbursement and pricing of prescrip-
tion drugs. However, prescription drugs will still be
part of the standardized benefits package of German
social health insurance. Individual third-party payers
are responsible for making sure that the provision of
prescription drugs is adequate.Thus, third-party pay-
ers decide which prescription drugs to reimburse in
order to fulfill this requirement. As a consequence,
third-party payers will also be able to exclude stand-
alone patents from reimbursement.
In this scenario third-party payers will attain addition-
al instruments for product differentiation. In return
for lower premiums and/or lower co-payments, third-
party payers will be able to offer “no-frills” packages
of prescription drugs – limited to generic and thera-
peutic substitutes and some stand-alone patents.
“Premium” packages might include more choice of
substitutes and stand-alone patents in return for high-
er premiums and/or higher co-payments. Conse-
quences for patients are rather ambiguous.On the one
hand, more choice would be available. As a conse-
quence, consumer choice becomes more important.
However,financial consequences for patients might be
substantial if stand-alone patents need to be paid out-
of-pocket in case of sudden ill health.
Implications for manufacturers in this scenario are
also very pronounced.In contrast to scenarios #1 and
#2, in this scenario price competition would also
apply to stand-alone patents. However, from the
experience on the private health insurance market
we know that third-party payers are very reluctant to
exclude stand-alone patents from reimbursement.
Manufacturers of stand-alone patents might even
link stand-alone patents to other products of their
portfolio. As a consequence the bargaining position
of manufacturers that produce only therapeutic or
generic substitutes will decrease and concentration
of the market will increase.
Conclusions
In this paper we analyze regulation of two important
parameters for third-party payers and manufacturers
of prescription drugs in a variety of health care sys-
tems. First, regulation of reimbursement determines
whether a specific prescription drug will be reim-
bursed by third-party payers or will only be available
to patients with a 100 percent co-payment. Second,
regulation of pricing determines the price third-
party payers have to pay for this specific prescription
drug. We distinguish between centralized regulation
and decentralized regulation.
We have found that the centralized regulation of
reimbursement and pricing prevails in most health
care systems. Regulation in German social health
insurance stands out as rather unique. In contrast to
other countries using centralized regulation, market
approval is equivalent to reimbursement. So far the
legislator does not allow country-specific formula-
ries.Moreover,cost-effectiveness may not be used to
exclude prescription drugs from reimbursement.
Pricing regulation in German social health insurance
is less restrictive than in other countries, too. Manu-
facturers are free to determine prices. However,
internal referencing sets incentives for manufactur-
ers not to exceed reference prices.
Centralized regulation of reimbursement and prices
in German social health insurance is increasingly
being placed under pressure. First, expenditures for
prescription drugs are increasing constantly and
more rapidly than expenditures in other health care
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sectors. Third-party payers are unable to control
expenditures. Second and more importantly, physi-
cians prescribe a considerable share of prescription
drugs that are more expensive than therapeutic or
generic substitutes.
Our comparison of different levels of regulation leads
to three reform scenarios. In scenario #1 prescription
drugs will be excluded from reimbursement if they
provide an unfavorable ratio between marginal costs
and marginal benefits. If these prescription drugs are
reimbursed at all, the price will be the same as for
generic or therapeutic substitutes.However,in this sce-
nario third-party payers will have a hard time setting
incentives for physicians to control expenditures.
Third-party payers will have a stronger bargaining
position in reform scenario #2, which is based on
decentralized pricing and centralized reimburse-
ment – similar to social health insurance in Israel.
Third-party payers will be able to negotiate with
manufacturers about discounts and market shares
for genetic and therapeutic substitutes.In contrast to
scenario #1, third-party payers will be obliged to
reimburse stand-alone patents and at least one pre-
scription drug per therapeutic or generic group.As a
consequence, third-party payers will be able to
establish insurer-specific incentive formularies. If
groups for generic and therapeutic substitutes are
homogeneous, incentives for the development of
innovative products are even more pronounced than
in scenario #1. Moreover, if third-party payers have
more instruments to manage care, they will also be
able to control expenditures more effectively.
Reform scenario #3 is based on decentralized pricing
and decentralized reimbursement – similar to the
private health insurance market in the US. Third-
party payers will attain additional instruments for
product differentiation. However, the consequences
for patients are rather ambiguous. Although con-
sumer choice becomes more important, financial
consequences for patients can be substantial.There-
fore, reform scenario #2 is a viable compromise bet-
ween consumer protection and a more competitive
and cost-effective market for prescription drugs in
German social health insurance and other similar
markets for prescription drugs.
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